1 The Concept of Necessity
When a response to a situation is by rule in the sense that given a particular set of circumstances the response follows and it cannot be any other response, then that response is said to be a necessary response. If we define an agent as anything, physical or nonphysical, that we are presently considering, then we may describe a necessary agent as one that is governed by necessity. In other words, whatever the agent’s response, it is wholly determined by its context or circumstance. A few examples will serve to illustrate the concept.
Consider an electronic switch (the agent) that is designed to switch to a high state, say 10 volts, if the input is above 1 volt, and to switch to a low state, say -10 volts, if the input is below 1 volt. Switching from 10 volts to -10 or vice versa is governed directly by the input. The switch is therefore an agent of necessity. This agent is either in a low state or a high state depending on the input and cannot be in any other state. This agent has a real inability to do anything but what the input dictates.
Now for a more complicated example, consider a ball (the agent) thrown into the air. Once the ball leaves the hand of the thrower it is subject to many forces, gravity, drag, air currents etc. These forces and the initial conditions of motion constitute the ball’s context. This context determines exactly the flight of the ball. An observer may not be able to predict the flight exactly (ask a potential batter) but that does not change the fundamental nature of the agent – it is governed by necessity (the pitcher would like to think so).
There are two related fundamental concepts associated with agents of necessity as outlined above. First, the response is by rule and as such is completely determined by the context. Second, the agent has a real inability to do anything else.
Now for an important question, does it make any sense to blame or praise an agent of necessity for any of its responses? I think not. There is nothing blameworthy or praiseworthy in a response that is by rule in the sense that there is a real inability to do otherwise. No engineer would blame a circuit for not switching at the right voltage or praise it if it did. Also, a batter is not likely to blame a ball for hitting him but the pitcher who gave the ball its initial conditions. These conclusions are, I think, considered reasonable by most people for the examples given. It is a wonder then how these simple concepts can become confused, but indeed they do.
Often agents of necessity are described as having the attribute of choice, and agents that have choice are described as agents of necessity, for the convenience of whoever is trying to make a point. Let it be clearly stated, therefore, before we enter the fog where our sense of direction may be lost, that agents of necessity do not possess the attribute of choice and therefore cannot be properly blamed or praised for anything. Also, agents that do have the attribute of choice, and can be properly blamed and praised, are not agents of necessity.
2 Choice as a System of Constraints
Choice as system of constraints is a corrupt concept of choice derived, by necessity, from a physicalist view of consciousness. (By using the words “by necessity” I do not mean that the holder of the physicalist view is an agent of necessity but simply that once he has chosen to hold this view the corrupted definition of choice follows by necessity.) This definition of choice holds that whatever is chosen is chosen because of a system of constraints that makes choosing something else impossible. For example, if someone ‘chooses’ to commit a crime it is because her context is such that according to her physical constitution she had no choice. Now if under the threat of prison this person does not commit the crime, the threat is seen as an addition to the context which now constrains, by necessity for her particular constitution, her behavior and brings about a different result. The behavior of this person is determined by her external and internal contexts and she, that is her consciousness, is either identically her context or just a helpless bystander.
Choice as a system of constraints is well represented in the scientific literature. Computer systems using decision theoretic techniques evaluate various hypotheses and settle on the one that optimizes some function describing the goodness of ‘choice’, subject to constraints. These systems are used to accomplish many tasks in an optimum fashion like running of an automobile engine, the economy, a defence system or a washing machine. There is nothing wrong with this procedure for it is beneficial and reasonable, but it does not involve choice and it should not be represented as doing so. No decisions are made and there is nothing blameworthy or praiseworthy in the behavior of agents governed by these systems for they are agents of necessity.
The only justification for calling these techniques decision theoretic is that they sometimes provide evidence for agents that do have choice. For these agents the evidence does not determine the choice but is only considered in making the choice.
3 Choice as an Offering
Choice as an offering represents choice as something that occurs if various options are presented to an agent. It does not matter if the agent selects any of the options it is still considered to have had the choice. This concept of choice is reasonable in a certain sense but totally unreasonable in another sense. It is reasonable in that choice must have various options associated with it. It is unreasonable in that, although not stated, there is no requirement for the agent to have a real ability to choose any of the options. It is enough that the options were somehow presented.
As an example of the unreasonableness of choice as an offering, consider presenting a meal to a hungry person who is gagged and has his hands tied behind his back. The meal is set before him and it is assumed that he has the option of eating it or not. That this situation is an unreasonable description of what choice means is intuitively obvious. The hungry person has no real ability to select the option of eating the meal and therefore has no choice. Who would think otherwise?
Taking this example further we might state that the person does have a choice in the sense that in his mind or consciousness he can choose to eat the meal but his hands are tied and therefore he could not (in the sense of a real inability) fulfill his choice. So in fact, he could have made a choice but we saw no evidence of it because he did not physically take the meal. This line of argument sounds reasonable and so it is. The physical inability (the tied hands) did not prevent the choice, it only prevented the choice from becoming evident. Now suppose that there was some obligation on the part of the hungry person to eat the meal, then by observing his behavior we might conclude that he did not meet his obligation and therefore he is blameworthy. But in reality he may not be at fault if the choice of his mind was to eat but the binding of his hands kept him from fulfilling his obligation. So then, in the presence of a real physical inability we have to look beyond the external behavior to the intent of the mind to determine choice.
Suppose now that somehow the mind is bound such that there is a real inability to choose a certain obligated option. For example, suppose the hungry person above is given a drug that clouds his judgement and he thinks he is full even though he is hungry. Here again the presentation of the food is not an option of choice because of the real inability. So, in the presence of a real inability there can be no blame and hence no choice. Therefore, an offering is not a choice unless it is accompanied by a real ability to choose that offering, and that real ability must be in the mind. It is not enough that there is physical ability.
4 Choice as Randomness
Choice as randomness is a concept that is often used in connection with computer algorithms for giving the illusion of options. For example, a robot is programmed to go right if a certain number is bigger than one and left otherwise. The certain number is chosen by a random number generator within the computer and the robot goes left or right accordingly. In describing the action, the robot is said to have chosen to go left or right. This use of the word choice is clearly absurd. Simple ignorance on the part of the observer as to what action will take place does not imply choice on the part of the agent under consideration.
To make matters worse the so called random number generator within the computer is nothing but an agent of necessity for there is really no randomness involved in its outcomes at all. Each number is generated from a previous seed number and once the seed is known the whole sequence of outcomes is known. An agent of necessity guiding an agent of necessity is still an agent of necessity and therefore does not possess the attribute of choice.
Suppose, however, that a true random number generator is available (the existence of such a thing has not been proven) could choice be a product of randomness? Certainly there are options and a real ability to select options so it looks like it might be possible except for one important issue. Is it proper to praise or blame a random process for the options it selects? I think most persons of reason would agree that it is not. Therefore, for choice to exist in the sense that the agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy there needs to be something behind choice. This something will be addressed in blog 3.
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