Choice is a word that is employed in common speech to express a concept. That concept, when probed, exposes how we as humans view our consciousness. In this paper choice is contrasted with necessity in such a way as to expose two fundamental principles that govern how we view the world around us. The first principle is that choice requires options such that there is an ability to actually select an option. Alternatively, necessity requires that there be no options in the sense that there is an inability to select or not select anything. The second principle is that choice admits the possibility of praise or blame, but necessity does not.
To reveal these principles commonly distorted definitions of choice were examined and it was shown each fails to capture the essence of the public meaning of choice. Examples from everyday life were used to sort out the public view. The first distorted definition considered choice to be a system of constraints. A system of constraints proved only to define an agent of necessity and not one of freedom. The second distorted definition considered choice to be an offering, which fell flat because there was no requirement for there to be an ability to select any of the offerings. The third distorted definition represented choice as randomness. While this definition met the requirement of real options, it did not admit the possibility of praise or blame.
To say one has a choice in anything is to say much more than first impressions imply. By first impressions we assume options are available and that the agent is somehow responsible for the choice made. But behind the word ‘available’ are the notions of ability and inability, and behind the word ‘responsibility’ are the notions of praise and blame. The issues of ability and inability have to be sorted out in each case of supposed choice to see if praise (blame) is a suitable response. The sorting out of ability and inability must be centered on issues of the mind for choice is an attribute of the mind. Behavior is not always an indicator of choice and this must be recognized.
A word of caution is due here. Simply because the possibility exists that behavior is not an indicator of choice does not mean that in most cases it is not. For behavior not to be an indicator of choice there has to be an inability on the part of the agent to bring choice to a corresponding response. Unfortunately, today is the day of the inability defence (I chose to do right but something prevented me, I am not to blame). Rare is the person who will admit blame for blameworthy choices, but many are those who will accept praise for fortunate situations of necessity. Let us understand that those who accept blame for blameworthy choices are worthy of praise, and those who accept praise for fortunate situations of necessity are worthy of blame.
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